Sanctions are not working. Confronting the “triangular trade,” which refers to the cooperation among Iran, China and North Korea on nuclear programs, is a growing challenge. In addition, Iran may have more than one plan to obtain full nuclear weapons capability.
“Indeed, the West could have it all wrong, says Graham. “The Iranians perhaps in fact are going to use their enrichment facilities at Natanz and Qom to fabricate peaceful reactor grade uranium, and have outsourced their nuclear program to North Korea. North Korea might even agree to store the Iranian weapons produced with Iranian money.” (Emphasis added.)
If that has already happened, or were North Korea to agree to it, there would be few if any reasons for it to be concerned about the imposition of more stringent sanctions. It has survived with sanctions for years and the Kim Regime members who matter have suffered little if at all from them. To the contrary, sanctions give the regime convenient scapegoats, principally the U.S., to blame for the problems of its peasants.
Might additional sanctions on the DPRK, based on additional nuclear activity there resulting from clandestine cooperation with Iran as suggested in the article, coupled with decreases in the severity of sanctions on Iran until that cooperation is detected, encourage even more DPRK – Iran partnership activity? If, as I previously speculated, reductions in the severity of sanctions on Iran would permit Iran to pay North Korea in hard currency or gold, the incentives for North Korea to augment its already mutually beneficial partnership with North Korea would be enhanced.
The international agencies charged with inspecting Iranian nuclear facilities have more often than not been prevented from doing so. Their chances of conducting successful inspections in North Korea seem even slimmer, making it unlikely that increased Iranian – North Korean cooperation would be detected. If it were detected, some of the lifted sanctions might be reimposed on Iran. However, even if caught Iran would not have to worry about destruction of its “peaceful” uranium enrichment facilities or worse and North Korea would not have to be concerned about military intervention; China would not allow it.
Is Iran outsourcing its nuclear program to North Korea?
By Pamela Browne
Published February 28, 2013
Is it possible Iran has paid for and outsourced their nuclear program to North Korea?
One leading expert say yes. And Iran might be providing their best nuclear scientist as well.
Reports that Iran’s leading nuclear scientist, Dr. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was present for North Korea’s third nuclear test on Feb. 11 are raising further concerns. Particularly since the latest international negotiations over Iran’s nuclear ambitions concluded this week in Almaty, Kazakhstan, with little more than an agreement to meet again.
The London Times first reported on Feb. 17 that Fakhrizadeh, who despite the terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1747, may have traveled “evidently to Pyongyang, most likely via China” to witness North Korea’s third and successful nuclear test. This despite the U.N. calling upon member states to “exercise vigilance and restraint” and…
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